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Abstract—Renewable resources are starting to constitute a growing portion of the total generation mix of the power system. A key
difference between renewables and traditional generators is that many renewable resources are managed by individuals, especially in
the distribution system. In this paper, we study the capacity investment and pricing problem, where multiple renewable producers
compete in a decentralized market. It is known that most deterministic capacity games tend to result in very inefficient equilibria, even
when there are a large number of similar players. In contrast, we show that due to the inherent randomness of renewable resources,
the equilibria in our capacity game becomes efficient as the number of players grows and coincides with the centralized decision from
the social planner’s problem. This result provides a new perspective on how to look at the positive influence of randomness in a game
framework as well as its contribution to resource planning, scheduling, and bidding. We validate our results by simulation studies using
real world data.
Index Terms—Capacity game, Nash equilibrium, renewables generation
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1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed renewable resources are starting to play an in-
creasingly important role in energy generation. For example,
the installation of photovoltaic (PV) panels across the world
has grown exponentially during the past decade [1]. These
renewable resources tend to be different from traditional
large-scale generators as they are often spatially distributed,
leading to many small generation sites across the system.
The proliferation of these individual renewable generators
(especially PV) has allowed for a much more flexible system,
but also led to operational complexities because they are
often not coordinated [2]. Recently, there has been strong
regulatory and academic push to allow these individual
generators to participate in a market, hoping to achieve a
more efficient and streamlined management structure [3],
[4]. Therefore, in this paper we study an investment game
where individual firms decide their installation capacities of
PV panels and compete to serve the load.
Currently, there are several lines of fruitful research
on the investment of solar energy resources. The common
challenge in these works is to address the pricing of solar
energy, since once installed, power can be produced at near
zero operational cost. In [5], feed-in tariffs (fixed prices) are
used to guide the investment decisions. In [6], [7], risks
about future uncertainties in prices are taken into account,
although these prices are assumed to be independent of the
investment decisions. Instead of exogenously determined
feed-in tariffs, [8], [9], [10] study incentive based pricing,
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arguing that the price of solar energies should match their
market value, which is the revenue that those resources
can earn in markets, without the income from subsidies.
However, the investment question of how to decide the
capacity of each solar installation is not considered.
A common assumption made in existing studies is that
an operator (or utility) makes centralized decisions about
the capacity of the solar installation at different sites [11],
[12] as well as the market clearing price upon aggregating
the bids from individual producers. On the other hand,
since small PV generation is mostly privately owned, it is
arguably more realistic to consider an environment where
both the investment and the pricing decisions are made in a
decentralized manner. In this market setting, the PV owners
compete by making their own investment and price bidding
decisions, based on the information they have, as opposed
to a centralized decision made by a single operator. In this
paper, we are interested in understanding these strategic
decisions, particularly in the electrical distribution system.
The competition between individual producers in a de-
centralized market for electricity is normally studied either
via the Cournot model or the Bertrand model [13]. In the
former, the producers compete via quantity, while in the
latter they compete via price. In this work, we adopt the
Bertrand competition to model price bidding since it is a
more natural process in the distribution system, where there
is no natural inverse demand function (required by the
Cournot competition model) [14], [15]. Then the investment
game becomes a two-level game as shown in Fig. 1b. For
any given capacities, the producers compete through the
Bertrand model to determine their prices to satisfy the
demand in the system. Then the outcome of this game feeds
into an upper level capacity game, where each producer
determines its investment capacities to maximize its expected
profit. Fig. 1 depicts a detailed comparison between this two-
level Bertrand game and a more centralized marketplace
where the utility selects the clearing price.
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2Energy producers submit a
per-unit bid and a supply cap
The designer selects k
buyers having the lowest
bids so that the total supply
matches the demand
The market clearing price
equals the k + 1th lowest
bid. Each of the k buyers
receives a per-unit payment
equal to the clearing price.
(a) A description of a centralized mechanism where a num-
ber of producers submit bids and a central authority sets the
market clearing price so that the overall supply coincides
with demand.
Energy producers determine
investment capacity to
maximize expected profit.
Given capacity, each producer
bids according to a Bertrand
model to maximize revenue.
Buyers purchase sequentially
starting with the lowest bid
until total demand is met
optimal revenue
(b) An illustration of the two level game between a group
of solar energy producers. In the higher level, the producers
determine their investment capacity to maximize expected
profit, and the lower game determines the pricing of solar
energy through Betrand competition.
Figure 1: Centralized vs. Decentralized market mechanisms.
This type of two-level game was studied in [16] in the
context of communication network expansion. They showed
that Nash equilibria exist, but the efficiency of any of
these equilibria are bad compared to the social planner’s
(or operator’s) solution. More precisely, as the number of
players grows, the social cost of all of the equilibria grow
with respect to the cost of the social planner’s problem.
Therefore, instead of increasing efficiencies, competition
can be arbitrarily bad. A similar intuition has existed in
traditional power system investment problems, where the
market power of the generators is highly regulated and
closely monitored [17].
In this paper, we show that contrary to the result in
[16], the investment game between renewable producers leads to
efficient outcomes under mild assumptions. More precisely, 1)
the investment capacity decisions made by the individual
producers match the capacity decisions that would be made
by a social planner; 2) as the number of producers increases,
the equilibria of the price game approaches a price level that
allows the producers to just recover their investment costs.
The key difference comes from the fact that renewables are
inherently random. Therefore instead of trying to exploit the
“corner cases” in a deterministic setting as in [16], [17],
the uncertainties in renewable production naturally induces
conservatism into the behavior of the producers, leading to
a drastic improvement of the Nash equilibria in terms of
efficiency. Therefore, uncertainty helps rather than hinders
the efficiency of the system.
To analyze the equilibria of the game, our work builds
on the results in [18]. In [18], the authors discuss the price
bidding strategies in markets with exactly two renewable
energy producers. They show that a unique mixed pric-
ing strategy always exists given that the capacity of those
producers are fixed beforehand. They extend it to a storage
competition problem in later work [19]. However, this work
did not address the strategic nature of the capacity invest-
ment decisions, nor did it consider markets with more than
two producers.
In our setting, we explicitly consider the joint competi-
tion for capacity considering each player’s investment cost,
as well as the bidding strategy to sell generated energy. This
problem is neither studied in traditional capacity investment
games (randomness is not considered) [20], [21]1 nor in
competition of renewable resources (investment strategy is
considered) [8], [24]. To characterize the Nash equilibria in
the two level capacity-pricing game, we consider two per-
formance metrics. The first is social cost, which is the total
cost of a Nash equilibrium solution with respect to the social
planner’s objective. The second is market efficiency, which
measures the market power of the energy producers. As a
comparison, the results in [16] show that in a deterministic
capacity-pricing game, as the number of producers grows,
neither the social cost nor the efficiency improves at equilibrium.
In contrast, we show that a little bit of randomness leads
to improvements on both metrics. Specifically, we make the
following two contributions:
1) We consider a two level capacity-pricing game be-
tween multiple renewable energy producers with
random production. We show that contrary to com-
monly held belief, randomness improves the quality
of the Nash equilibria.2
2) We explicitly characterize the Nash equilibria and
show that the social cost and efficiency improve as
the number of producers grows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 motivates the problem set up and details the modeling
of both the decentralized and centralized market. Section 3
formally introduces the evaluation metrics for our setting.
Section 4 presents the main results of this paper, i.e., the
1. The work in [22], [23] studies an investment game where the
demand curve is uncertain, but under a very different context than
ours
2. This is conceptually similar to the results obtained in [25], where
randomness increases the efficiency of Cournot competition.
3relationship between the proposed decentralized market
and the social planner’s problem, and the analysis on the
efficiency of the game in the decentralized market. Proofs
for the main theorems are left in the appendices for inter-
ested readers. The simulation results are shown in Section 5
followed by the conclusion in Section 6.
2 TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Motivation
Traditionally, power systems are often built and operated
in a centralized fashion. The system operator acts as the
social planner by aggregating the producers and makes cen-
tralized decisions on investment and scheduling (as shown
in Fig. 2a). The goal of the social planner is to maximize
the overall welfare of the whole system— this includes
optimizing the costs incurred due to the investment and
installation, and the cost paid by the consumers.
(a) Centralized. (b) Decentralized.
Figure 2: Centralized vs. decentralized market setup.
However, as distributed energy resources (DERs) start to
disperse across the power distribution network, the central-
ized setup becomes difficult to maintain and manage. DERs
such as rooftop PV cells are small, numerous, and owned by
individuals, allowing them to act as producers and choose
their own capacities and prices. Consequently, managing
these resources through a decentralized market (as shown
in Fig. 2b) is starting to gain significant traction in the power
distribution system.
Several issues arise in a decentralized market. Chief
among them is that it is not clear whether the decentral-
ized market achieves the same decision as if there were a
central planner maximizing social welfare. The competition
between energy producers is suboptimal if the following
occurs:
• If the investment decisions by the competing produc-
ers deviate from the social planner’s decision: this
means that the competition is sub-optimal when it
comes to finding a socially desirable investment plan.
• If the bidding strategy leads to a higher payment
from electricity consumers than that from the social
planner’s decision, it means that the energy resource
producers are taking advantage of the buyers and the
market is not efficient.
Both of these adverse phenomena can happen in decen-
tralized markets in the absence of uncertainty [16], [26],
[27], even when there are a large number of individual
players. However, the rest of this paper shows that neither
of them occur in a decentralized market with renewables
resources having random generation. We show that the
inherent uncertainty in the production naturally improves
the quality of competition. We start by formally introducing
the game in the next section.
2.2 Renewable Production Model
Throughout this paper, we denote some important terms by
the following:
• Zi: Random variable representing the output of pro-
ducer i, scaled between 0 and 1. The moments of Zi
are denoted as EZi = µi, E(Zi − EZi)2 = σ2i and
E|Zi − EZi|3 = ρi.
• Ci: Capacity of producer i.
• D: Total electricity demand in the market
• N : Number of producers in the market.
• γi: Investment cost for unit capacity for producer i.
• ξ: Efficiency of the game equilibrium.
• x−i: The quantities chosen by all other producers
except i, that is x−i = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ].
• (x)+ := max(x, 0).
• (x)− := min(x, 0).
Renewable Production Model: When producer i invests in
a capacity of Ci, its actual generation of energy is a random
variable given by CiZi ≤ Ci. That is, due to the randomness
associated with renewables, its realized production may not
equal its maximum capacity.
We make the following assumption on the Zi’s:
[A1] We assume that the random variable Zi has support
[0, 1] and its density function is bounded and continuous on
its domain. This assumption is mainly made for analytical
convenience and captures a wide range of probabilistic
distributions used in practice, e.g., truncated normal distri-
bution and uniform distribution. Furthermore, we assume
that Zi is not a constant, so E(Zi − EZi)2 = σ2i > 0.
We also make the following assumptions on demand D:
[B1] We assume that the random variable D is non-negative
and thatD is bounded, i.e.,Dmin ≤ D ≤ Dmax where DminDmax
is a constant bounded away from zero.
2.3 Competition in decentralized markets
Consider N renewable producers who compete in a de-
centralized market. Each producer needs to decide two
quantities: capacity (sizing) and the corresponding everyday
price bidding strategy. To make this decision, each pro-
ducer needs to take into consideration the fact that larger
capacities lead to higher investment costs but may also
result in enhanced revenue due to increased sales. If the
invested capacity is low, then the investment cost is low
but the producer risks staying out of the market because
of less capability to provide energy. Therefore competition
requires non-trivial decision making by the decentralized
stakeholders. In this paper, we consider both cases where
each producer has either same or different investment cost.
To start with, let us assume γi = γ for all i. This assumption
is true to the first order since the solar installation cost in
an area is roughly the same for all the consumers. A more
4general case with different γi’s is left to Section 4.6. Since the
producers need to compete for capacity based on revenue
(which is determined by optimal bidding), we refer to the
capacity competition—how much to invest—as the capacity
game and the pricing competition, i.e., how much to bid, as
the price sub-game. To generalize the scenario we assume that
the price bidding is a one-time action that approximates an
amortized version of a series of continuous bidding actions.
2.4 Capacity game
The ultimate decision for the producers is to determine the
optimal capacity to invest in. Suppose that the capacity is
denoted by Ci for each producer i, then each producer’s
objective is to maximize its profit, which is specified as:
(Profit) pii(Ci, C−i)− γCi,∀i, (1)
where pii(Ci, C−i) is the payment (revenue) from con-
sumers to producer i when its capacity is fixed at Ci and
the others’ capacities are fixed at C−i. This payment is
determined by the price sub-game given that a capacity
decision is already made, i.e.,C = [C1, C2, ..., CN ]: we leave
a detailed discussion of the revenue and the price sub-game
to Section 2.5. The term γCi represents the investment cost.
Since we are in a game-theoretic scenario, the appropri-
ate solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium. Specifi-
cally, a capacity vector C = [C1 , C

2 , ..., C

N ] is said to be a
Nash equilibrium if:
Ci = arg max
Ci≥0
pii(Ci, C

−i)− γCi,∀i, (2)
The Nash equilibrium shown in (2) is interpreted as the
following: each producer i chooses a capacity Ci such that
given the optimal capacity strategy of the others, there is
no incentive for this producer to deviate from this capacity
Ci. Note that while choosing its capacity, each producer im-
plicitly assumes that its resulting revenue is decided by the
solution obtained via the price sub-game. Note that for each
PV producer to make a decision according to (2), it needs to
know the distribution of demandD, where random variable
D can be seen as discounted back from infinite horizon so
we do not explicitly model Dt in this manuscript. It also
needs to know the distribution of solar radiation Zi, and
investment price γ as shown in next Section. Distribution
of D can be obtained through historical data, Zi can be es-
timated based on geographical differences, and investment
price should be publicly available given that PV producers
use similar materials to fabricate panels. Therefore each PV
player can independently play its strategy without accessing
private information of others.
2.5 Price sub-game
In this section, we explicitly characterize the payment func-
tion pii(Ci, C−i) at the equilibrium solution of the price
sub-game for a fixed capacity vector (Ci)1≤i≤N . The pro-
ducers now compete to sell energy at some price pi. This
is known as the Bertrand price competition model, where
the consumer prefers to buy energy at low prices. In this
model, consumers resort to buying at a higher price only
when the capacity of all the lower-priced producers are
exhausted. Suppose that the profit for producer i when the
producers bid at p = [p1, p2, ..., pN ] = [pi,p−i] is denoted
by pii(Ci,C−i, pi,p−i). We make the following assumption
about the prices:
[A2] The customers have the options to buy energy at unit
price from the main grid.
This assumption follows the current structure of a distri-
bution system, where customers have access to the main
grid at a fixed price, and here we normalize the price to
1. Equivalently, this can be thought as the value of the lost
load in a microgrid without a connection to the bulk electric
system [28].
As shown in [16], [18], there is no pure Nash equilibrium
on p for the price sub-game. Intuitively, this means that no
player can bid at a single deterministic price and achieve the
most revenue, since the other players can undercut by a tiny
amount and sell all their generation. Therefore no player
settles on a pure strategy. Such a situation particularly arises
where each producer is small (Ci ≤ D,∀i), but the aggregate
is large (
∑
i Ci > D, where D denotes the total demand in
the market).
However, there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium on price p,
where the optimal bids follow a distribution such that the
bids of each DER are independent of the rest. Informally,
this implies that each producer i draws its price pi from
a distribution P∗i , which maximizes its expected revenue
given the distributions of the other producers. For exam-
ple, the price distribution of a two player Bertrand model
is given in [18]. For our purpose, the exact form of the
optimal price distribution is not of particular interest. The
quantity of interest is the form of the revenue function ,
i.e., the expected payment, resulting from this random price
bidding. Let us denote the expected payment to producer
i based on the optimal random price by pii(Ci,C−i) =
Ep∼P∗1×...×P∗Npii(Ci,C−i, pi,p−i). Proposition 1 character-
izes the optimal payment to each producer:
Proposition 1. Given any solution (C1, C2, . . . , CN ) having
C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ CN , the expected payment received by
producer i in the equilibrium of the pricing sub-game is given
by:
pii(C1, . . . , CN ) = piN (C1, . . . , CN )
CiE[min(Zi, DCi )]
CNE[min(ZN , DCN )]
.
(3)
Moreover, the expected payment received by producer N with the
largest capacity investment is given by:
piN (CN ,C−N ) = EDEZN ,Z−N min{(D−
∑
j 6=N
ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}.
(4)
As a consequence of Proposition 1, we have that if the
capacities are symmetric at equilibrium, i.e., C1 = C2 = · =
CN , and Zi’s are identically distributed for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
the expected payment of producer i is given by:
pii(Ci,C−i) = EDEZi,Z−i min{(D −
∑
j 6=i
ZjC)
+, ZiCi}.
A complete proof of Proposition 1 is deferred to the
Appendix. Let us now understand Proposition 1 for the
symmetric investment solution. Equation (4) denotes the
5payment received by producer i when it bids determinis-
tically at price pi = 1 and all of the other producers bid
according to their mixed pricing strategy. By assumption
A2, this player bids at the highest possible price. Then the
amount of energy sold equals the minimum of the leftover-
demand from the market (E(D − ∑j 6=i ZjCj)+) and the
player’s actual production (CiZi). Since pi = 1 belongs to
the support of the mixed pricing strategy adopted by this
player, one can use well known properties of mixed Nash
equilibrium [16], [18] to argue that producer i’s payment
at this price equals the expected payment received by this
producer at the equilibrium for the pricing sub-game.
3 EVALUATION METRICS
3.1 Social planner’s problem
One essential characteristic of a game is its cost as compared
to a centralized decision. In this section, we present the
benchmark cost that we consider; in particular, we focus on
the social cost minimization achieved by a social planner
controlling the producers. In Section 3.2 we give more
details on the definition of game efficiency as compared to
this benchmark.
Suppose that these producers are managed by a social
planner in a centralized manner. The purpose of the social
planner is to fulfill demand while minimizing the total cost
by deciding the investment capacities of the producers.
Since we approximate the continuous actions of energy
buying and selling from PV producer to a one-time action
as in Section 2.3, the social planner thus wants to minimize
social cost in the following form:
C∗ = arg min
Ci≥0,∀i∈{1,2,...,N}
N∑
i=1
γCi+E{(D−
N∑
i=1
ZiCi)
+}, (5)
where C∗ = [C∗1 , C
∗
2 , ..., C
∗
N ] is the optimal capacity de-
cision from the social planner for each producer i, and
expectation is over all randomness, i.e., Zi’s and D. In what
follows, we adopt this routine if not specifcied otherwise.
The social cost presented in (5) is composed of two terms.
The first term is the total investment cost which is linear in
the capacities, and the second term is the imbalance cost
in buying energy from electricity grid if the renewables
cannot satisfy the demand. These two terms represent the
tradeoff between investing energy resources and buying
energy from conventional generators in order to meet the
electricity demand.
3.2 Performance of the decentralized market
Given the definition of the equilibrium solutions due to
both price and capacity competition, a natural question is to
evaluate the performance of the decentralized market: i.e.,
does competition result in efficiency?. As mentioned previously,
we measure this efficiency via two metrics: the social cost
of the decentralized capacity investment compared to that
achieved by the social planner, and the total investment cost
compared to the payments made by the demand.
Example. Let us consider a one-player case with determin-
istic demand D, where there is only one producer partici-
pating in the electricity market. We further assume that the
random output of this plant follows a uniform distribution,
i.e., Z1 ∼ unif(0, 1). Suppose that γ < 12 , otherwise there
is no incentive to enter the market. The social planner’s
optimization is reduced to :
C∗1 = arg min
C1
γC1 + E(D − Z1C1)+, (6)
where C∗1 =
√
D2
2γ . In this case, the total investment cost is
D
√
γ
2 : in a centralized scenario, one can imagine that this is
the price charged by the social planner to the demand, and
thus there is no ‘markup’.
Let us now take a look at the decentralized market. Since
there is only one producer, the decentralized investment
strategy clearly coincides with that of the social planner.
The payment from the demand to the producer as per (4)
is Emin{D,Z1C1} = D(1 −
√
γ
2 ) > D
√
γ
2 (when γ <
1
2 ).
This suggests that the producer is exploiting its market
power to considerably improve its profit and the benefits
of renewables are not being transferred to the consumers.
Market Efficiency As noticed in the above example, inef-
ficiency arises due to the high prices felt by the demand
in the decentralized market. Formally, we define market
efficiency as the ratio between the investment cost paid
by the producers to the total payment received by the
producers at any equilibrium of the capacity price game.
Therefore, efficiency takes the following form:
ξ =
γ
∑N
i=1 C

i∑N
i=1 pi(C

i ,C

−i)
. (7)
A “healthier” game should achieve a higher ξ that is as
close as to 1. This means that the producers should bid at
the prices that cover their investment cost, so that bidding
is efficient and does not take advantage of the electricity
consumers. A particularly interesting question is whether
competition leads to increased efficiency as the number of
producers in the market increases. We formalize this notion
below.
Definition 1. We define the efficiency of a Nash equilibrium
in a capacity game illustrated in (1) by ξ. The capacity game
is asymptotically efficient when ξ → 1 as N → ∞ for every
Nash equilibrium.
Now the question of interest is 1) whether uncertainty in
generation deteriorates or improves the market efficiency of
the game, and 2) whether efficiency increases as the number
of players in the game increases. In the following sections,
we will see that without randomness in the generation,
the producers are able to charge a relatively high price for
energy, which makes the game less efficient. Interestingly,
when producer’s generation becomes uncertain, the game
becomes more efficient as more producers are involved in
the decentralized market.
Inefficiency due to Social Cost: When there are multiple
producers, it is possible that even the investment decisions
may not coincide with that of the social planner. Therefore,
a second source of inefficiency is the social cost due to the
capacity investment, as defined in (5). More concretely, we
compare the social cost of the equilibrium solution (Ci )
with that of the social cost of the planner’s optimal capacity
(C∗i )— clearly, the latter cost is smaller than or equal to the
former.
63.3 Deterministic game
Before moving on to the main results, we highlight the
(in)efficiency of the equilibrium in the deterministic version
of the capacity game, i.e., one without production uncer-
tainty where Zi = 1 with probability one. Understanding
the inefficiency of this deterministic game is the starting
point for us to better gauge the effects of uncertainty in
investment games.
We begin with the social planner’s problem with fixed
D, which in the absence of uncertainty can be formulated as
follows:
min
Ci≥0,∀i∈{1,2,...,N}
γ
N∑
i=1
Ci + (D −
N∑
i=1
Ci)
+. (8)
Every solution with non-negative capacities that satisfies∑N
i=1 C
∗
i = D optimizes the above objective — this includes
the symmetric solution C∗1 = C
∗
2 = · · · = C∗N = DN . Moving
on to the decentralized game with deterministic energy
generation, we can directly characterize the equilibrium so-
lutions using the results from [16]. Specifically, by applying
Proposition 13 in that paper, we get although there are mul-
tiple equilibrium solutions, every such solution (Ci)1≤i≤N
satisfies (i)
∑N
i=1 Ci = D, and (ii) pii(Ci,C−i) = Ci.
The second result implies that at every equilibrium, each
producer charges a price that is equal to the electricity price
of one from the main grid. Finally, by applying (7), we can
characterize the efficiency in terms of the investment cost γ:
ξ =
γD
D
= γ. (9)
Why is this result undesirable? First note that when γ <
1, (9) implies that the deterministic game is inefficient at
every Nash equilibrium. In fact, using the results from [16],
one can deduce that the system is inefficient even when
different producers have different investment costs. Perhaps
more importantly, the costs of investment as well as the
market price of renewable energy have dropped consistently
over the past decade and are expected to continue doing so
in the future [29], [30], [31]. In this context, Equation (9)
has some stark implications, namely that as γ (the investment
price) drops in the long-run, the efficiency actually becomes worse
(ξ → 0 as γ → 0), i.e., the improvements in renewable
technologies do not benefit the electricity consumers.
4 MAIN RESULTS
To better illustrate the results, In this section, we first assume
that γi’s are the same across all producers and characterize
the capacity decision from the social planner’s problem. We
then illustrate the relationship between the decentralized
market, and the social planner’s problem in the centralized
market. We also give a thorough analysis on the efficiency of
the decentralized market. We begin by considering the case
where the capacity generated by the producers are indepen-
dent of each other and then move on to the correlated case.
In the end of this section, we extend the result to asymmetric
γi’s. All of the proofs from this section can be found in the
appendix.
4.1 Social planner’s optimal decision
An immediate observation of the socially optimal capacity
as described in (5) is that if the randomness is independent
and identical across different producers, the socially optimal
capacity is symmetric:
Theorem 1. If the random variables Zi are i.i.d. and satisfy
assumption A1 and γi = γ,∀i, then the optimal capacity obtained
by (5) is symmetric, i.e., C∗1 = C
∗
2 = · · · = C∗N = C∗.
Theorem 1 states that when the investment cost per unit
capacity is the same across all producers, and the random
variable is i.i.d., then the optimal decision for the social
planner is to treat all producers equally and invest the
same amount of capacity for each producer. In reality, the
randomness due to renewable sources can be correlated and
Section 4.4 shows that Theorem 1 stills holds under some
conditions on the nature of the correlation.
4.2 Existence and Social Cost
Now that we have captured the structure of the socially
optimal capacity decision, we want to address the issue
of whether or not the capacity price game admits Nash
equilibrium solutions in the decentralized market. A second
question concerns the social cost of Nash equilibria when
compared to the optimum investment decision adopted by
a social planner. As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the
two sources of inefficiency in decentralized stems from the
fact that the social cost of equilibrium solutions may be
larger than that of the central planner’s solution. We present
Theorem 2 which addresses both of these questions by
proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium that coincides
with the socially optimal capacity decision. Characterizing
other Nash equilibriums is left to Theorem 3 in Section 4.3.
Theorem 2. There is a Nash equilibrium that satisfies (2), which
also minimizes the social cost. That is, (C∗, C∗, . . . , C∗) is a
Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, existence is always guaranteed in our setting.
More importantly, Theorem 2 provides an interesting rela-
tionship between the centralized decision that minimizes
social cost, and the decentralized decision where producers
seek to maximize profit. It states that the game yields a
socially optimal capacity investment solution as if there
were a social planner controlling the producers. In addition,
as we will show later in Section 4.5, this Nash equilibrium is
the unique symmetric equilibrium in the capacity game. For
the following sections, we use C∗ to denote both the socially
optimal capacity decision and this Nash equilibrium.
4.3 Efficiency of Nash equilibrium
Although the capacity price game studied this work admits
a Nash equilibrium that minimizes the social planner’s
objective, there may also exist other equilibria that result
in sub-optimal capacity investments. How do these (po-
tential) multiple equilibria look like from the consumers’
perspective, i.e., is the price charged to consumers larger
than the investment? In this section, we show a surprising
result: the two-level capacity-pricing game is asymptotically
efficient. That is, as N → ∞, the total payment made to
7the producers approaches the investment costs for every
Nash equilibrium. The reason for this startling effect is that
as the number of producers competing against each other
in the market increases, with the presence of uncertainty,
the market power of these producers decreases and the
efficiency of the game equilibrium increases. We first present
our main theorem with i.i.d. generation.
Theorem 3. Let (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) denote any Nash equilibrium
solution in an instance with N producers and N > 1Dmin
Dmax
γ
,
where γi = γ,∀i. Then, as long as the Zi’s are i.i.d and satisfy
assumption A1, we have that:
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci + αN
−c,
where α, c > 0 are constants that are independent of N .
Therefore, as N → ∞, ξ → 1, where ξ denotes the market
efficiency due to any Nash equilibrium solution.
Combining Theorems 2 and 3 yields that if we restrict
the game to only have the symmetric equilibrium, then
the equilibrium minimizes the social cost and the game
is asymptotically efficient. Moving beyond the symmetric
equilibrium, Theorem 3 states that any Nash equilibrium ob-
tained from the capacity game is efficient, that the collected
payment (revenue) tends to exactly cover the investment
cost. This further suggests that the capacity game described
in (1) elicits the true incentive for the producers to generate
energy.
4.4 Correlated generation
In reality, renewable generation due to multiple entities in
a power distribution network is usually correlated with
each other because of geographical adjacencies. We assume
that the randomness of each producer’s generation can be
captured as an additive model written as the following:
Zi = Zˆi + Z¯. (10)
The model in (10) captures the nature of renewable genera-
tion. We can interpret Z¯ as the shared random variable for
a specific region. For example, the average solar radiation
for a region should be common to every PV output in that
region. On the other hand, Zˆi can be seen as the individual-
level random variable for the particular location of each PV
plant i, and this random variable can be seen as i.i.d. across
different locations.
For analytical convenience, we make the following as-
sumptions on Zi:
[A3] Both Z¯ and Zˆi in (10) satisfy assumption A1, the Zˆi’s
are i.i.d, and are independent of Z¯ for all i.
If the correlation is captured as in (10), the optimal
capacity decision is still symmetric, i.e., C∗i = C
∗
j ,∀i 6= j
is a valid solution to (5). This is stated in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. If the random variable Zi is captured as in (10) and
assumption A3 is satisfied, then the optimal capacity vector that
minimizes the planner’s social cost is symmetric, i.e., C∗1 = C
∗
2 =
· · · = C∗N = C∗ when γi = γ,∀i.
In addition, note that Theorem 2 does not require the i.i.d
assumption on Zi. Therefore, we infer that the symmetric
solution that minimizes social cost is a Nash equilibrium
even when the generation is correlated. In what follows, we
further show that correlation does not tamper the efficiency
of any Nash equilibria in the capacity game.
Theorem 5. Suppose that (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) denotes any Nash
equilibrium solution in an instance with N producers and N >
1
γ , where γi = γ,∀i. Then, as long as the random variable Zi, is
captured in (10), and assumption A3 is satisfied, we have that:
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci + αN
−c,
where α, c > 0 are constants that are independent of N .
Theorem 5 extends the statement in Theorem 3 from
i.i.d. random variables to correlated random variables. This
indicates that if the randomness of each producer is cap-
tured by an additive model interpreted as the sum of
shared randomness and individual-level randomness, then
the decentralized market is efficient and that both producers
and electricity users benefit from this market.
4.5 Uniqueness of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Although our setting could admit many equilibrium solu-
tions, we know that one of these solutions must always
be symmetric, i.e., every producer has the same investment
level. This solution is of particular interest as it minimizes
the social cost. We now show that the symmetric Nash
equilibrium C∗1 , C
∗
2 , . . . , C
∗
N is unique in Theorem 6.
Theorem 6. Under assumption A1, the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in the capacity game (1) is unique.
Theorem 6 states that there is only one symmetric Nash
equilibrium in the capacity game. This indicates that if the
decentralized market is regulated such that each producer
behaves similarly in the presence of uncertainty, then it is
guaranteed that the competition is both efficient and socially
optimal in the investment decision.
4.6 Results on Asymmetric investment price
We now extend our results to a more general case when
PV providers’ investment price is different. This would be
the case when installation is dispersed cross areas where
unit installation cost is not the same. We consider an ar-
bitrary equilibrium solution of the two-level game with
asymmetric investment costs, (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ), such that
C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ CN . This assumption is clearly without
loss of generality. Moreover, we assume that γi represents
the investment cost of the PV whose capacity at equilibrium
is given by Ci . Let γmin = mini γi. We start with Theorem
7, which guarantees that the game always admits a Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 7. Given an instance of the PV game in (1), but with
asymmetric investment costs γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γN , there always
exists a Nash equilibrium for the capacity game as long as the
distributions (Zi)Ni=1 are identical.
Detailed proof is left in Appendix G. With this guarantee,
we now introduce the result on the efficiency of the game
with asymmetric γi’s.
8Theorem 8. Suppose that (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) denotes any Nash
equilibrium solution in an instance withN producers, asymmetric
investment costs (γ1, . . . , γN ) and N > 1Dmin
Dmax
γmin
. Then,
as long as the random variable Zi, is captured in (10), and
assumption A3 is satisfied, we have that:
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) ≤
N∑
i=1
γmaxC

i + αN
−c,
where α, c > 0 are constants that are independent of N and
γmax = maxi γi.
Since the actual investment cost incurred by the
providers is
∑N
i=1 γiC

i , the above theorem implies that the
ratio of the total payment to the investment costs (e.g., the
price of anarchy) is at most γmaxγmin . This allows us to quantify
the efficiency at equilibrium. The efficiency is thus quan-
tified by how much the largest invest price γmax deviates
from each of the γi’s. When the investment prices are not
very different across producers which should be the realistic
case, the efficiency is not very far away from the case when
γi’s are the same.
5 SIMULATION
In this section, we validate the statements by providing
simulation results based on both synthetic data and real PV
generation data. We use the symmetric Nash equilibrium as
the solution of interest in our simulations.
5.1 Two-player game
Let us assume that the generation distribution is uniform,
i.e., Zi ∼ unif(0, 1). Suppose that the investment price is
the same for all players, i.e., γ = 0.25, then following the
analysis in Section 4, we know that the optimal capacity
satisfies C∗1 = C
∗
2 . Assuming that the demand is uniformly
distributed between 0.75 and 1.25, we solve the social opti-
mization in (5) with equal investment price γ. The optimal
solution leads to a total capacity of C∗tot = C
∗
1 + C
∗
2 = 1.71,
where C∗1 = C
∗
2 = 0.86. The result is shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Social cost with respect to total capacity when
investment price is the same.
To verify that C∗1 = C
∗
2 = 0.86 is indeed a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, we vary the capacity from C∗1 and study
how player 1’s profit changes. The analysis for player 2 pro-
ceeds in the same way because of symmetry. We show the
result of optimality for player 1 in Fig. 4 in terms of profit,
with a fixed capacity for player 2 where C2 = C∗2 = 0.86.
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Figure 4: Profit for player 1 when its capacity deviates from
C∗1 .
As can be seen from Fig. 4, the profit for player 1—
when the other player’s capacity is fixed at C∗2 —peaks at
C1 = C
∗
1 . By symmetry, we can argue that player 2’s profit
is maximized at C∗2 when player 1’s capacity remains fixed.
Therefore, (C∗1 , C
∗
2 ) is indeed a Nash equilibrium as neither
player has any incentive to deviate from its investment
strategy. In other words, the socially optimal capacity is also
a Nash equilibrium for the game shown in (1).
5.2 N-player game
To illustrate that the Nash equilibrium is efficient with
respect to the metric defined in (7), we need to show that
the payment collected from users in the game exactly covers
the investment costs of the producers when the number
of producers increases. Since the computational complex-
ity grows exponentially with the number of producers (if
they are not identical), the simulation is unachievable for
large number of asymmetric producers. For illustration
purposes we simulate the capacity game with identical
players (γi = 0.25,∀i) with i.i.d. generation (uniform dis-
tribution). We then compute the efficiency ξ when there
are 10, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 players in the game. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Efficiency of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
the game as a function of number of players.
In Fig. 5, we see that the efficiency is growing with the
number of players in the game. We therefore infer that the
competition is healthy as the producers only bid their true
costs and do not exploit the consumers of electricity.
5.3 Case study using real data
In this section, we simulate the efficiency of the game
equilibrium using a real PV generation profile obtained from
9the National renewable energy laboratory [32]. Our data
comes from distributed PVs located in California with a 5
minute resolution. Typical PV profiles after normalization
are shown in Fig. 6. From Fig. 6, we see that the random-
ness of PV generation from different locations is strongly
correlated. The correlation between those PV profiles is also
symmetric across different PV plants, as shown in Fig. 7.
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Figure 6: PV generation profile in different locations.
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Figure 7: Correlation of PV generation in different locations.
A lighter color (yellow) represents stronger correlation and
dark colors (blue) represent weak correlation.
We then use these PV profiles to obtain the game equilib-
rium as we vary the number of PV participants. The result
is shown in Table 1, with the assumption that γ = 0.15.
As we can see from Table 1, in the absence of random-
ness when the producers are assumed to generate energy
deterministically, the efficiency is the investment price as
described in Equation (9). The efficiency of the game with
uncertainty improves as the numbers of producers in the
market increases.
Table 1: Game efficiency with different number of producers,
when investment price is 0.15 and demand D = 5.
Number of producers 5 30 120
Efficiency of deterministic producers 0.15 0.15 0.15
Efficiency of random producers 0.83 0.96 0.98
Table 2: The ratio between total capacity and market de-
mand , i.e.,
∑
i C
∗
i /D, when investment price is 0.15 and
demand D = 5.
Number of producers 5 30 120∑
i C
∗
i /D with deterministic producers 1 1 1∑
i C
∗
i /D with random producers 1.26 1.32 1.30
In addition, in a deterministic game, the total capacity
is always the same as the market demand because there is
no randomness in generation. In the capacity game with
uncertainty, since each producer faces randomness in its
own production as well as the random generation from the
other producers, the total invested capacity is greater than
demand as illustrated in Table. 2. This means that in the
capacity game with uncertainty, the total capacity exceeds
demand elicits competition among producers.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we consider a scenario where many dis-
tributed energy resources compete to invest and sell energy
in a decentralized electricity market especially when uncer-
tainty is present. Each energy producer optimizes its profit
by selling energy. We show that such a competitive game
has a Nash equilibrium that coincides with the solution
from a social welfare optimization problem. In addition, we
show that all Nash equilibria are efficient, in the sense that
the collected payment to the energy producers approaches
their investment costs. Our statement is validated both by
theoretical proofs and simulation studies. Finally, we show
that in systems where the investment costs are asymmetric,
the inefficiency is at most the ratio of the maximum and
minimum investment costs. Of course, in many situations,
one can expect different producers have access to similar
technologies and therefore, approximately similar invest-
ment costs. This can lead to small and bounded levels of
inefficiency in practice.
Our work raises a number of intriguing possibilities for
future research in this area. First, it is worth noting that
the setting studied in this paper admits a multiplicity of
equilibrium solutions; we side-step this issue by proving
that all of the equilibria are efficient from the perspective
of the consumers. In future work, it may be beneficial
to study these equilibria in greater detail, particularly the
solutions that are more likely to be formed in practice
and understand how they compare to the optimal capacity
investment strategy. Secondly, this work focuses on the
properties of a very specific auction mechanism where each
producer sells energy at the exact bid price (i.e., pay-as-
bid auction). Understanding how other commonly proposed
auction formats—e.g., Cournot mechanism [25], [33], clock
auctions [34] —behave under uncertainty is interesting from
a design perspective.
Finally, the central theme in this work—that of lever-
aging uncertainty to improve outcomes—is applicable to a
wide range of systems with some uncertainty in demand
or supply. This could include markets in domains such
as transportation, communication, cloud computing, etc.
Characterizing broad conditions under which uncertainty
helps or harms systems with self-interested agents is indeed
an important avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 1
We know that the producers adopt a mixed pricing strat-
egy in the equilibrium for the pricing sub-game. Let li, ui
denote the lower and upper support of the distribution
corresponding to the mixed strategy of producer i. From
previous results [16], [18] and assumption A2, we know that
li = lj and ui = uj = 1 for all i, j. Therefore, let p denote
the common lower support (price) for every producer, it is
claimed in [18] that only one producer can have an atom and
it must be at upper support. Using the basic properties of
mixed strategy equilibria (e.g., see [16]), we can infer that the
total payment received by any producer i equals its payment
when this producer bids a deterministic price of p and all of
the other producers bid according to their mixed strategies
in the pricing sub-game equilibrium. Explicitly writing this
out, we get
pii(C1, C2, . . . , CN ) = pE[min(CiZi, D)] = pCiE[min(Zi,
D
Ci
)]
(11)
piN (C1, C2, . . . , CN ) = pE[min(CNZN , D)] = pCNE[min(Zi,
D
CN
)].
Indeed, observe that when any one player selects a price
of p, all of the capacity generated by this player must be
sold because no other player can bid below this price and
the probability that other players bid exactly at this price
can be ignored due to the lack of atoms. Using the second
equation above, we can explicitly characterize p in terms
of the payment received by the producer with the highest
capacity investment, i.e.,
p =
piN (C1, C2, . . . , CN )
CNE[min(Zi, DCN )]
.
Substituting the above into Equation 11 gives us:
pii(C1, C2, . . . , CN ) = piN (C1, C2, . . . , CN )
CiE[min(Zi, DCi )]
CNE[min(ZN , DCN )]
.
In order to complete the proof, we need to show that
piN (CN , C−N ) = E[min{(D−
∑
j 6=N ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}]. The
proof utilizes techniques very similar to those adopted
in [16], so we only sketch the details and highlight the key
differences. As argued before, in the equilibrium for the
pricing sub-game, each producer i plays a mixed strategy
with prices in the range [pi, 1]. We first claim that in the
equilibrium at most one player has an atom at the upper
support price and this can only be producerN . The first part
of the claim can be proved similar to the proof of Lemma 5
in [16], namely that if multiple producers have an atom at
the upper support, then at least one producer can deviate to
having an atom at price 1 −  instead and strictly improve
its profit. For the second part, assume by contradiction that
another producer (say i) has atom at the upper support.
By assumption, only producer i has an atom at the upper
support. So, when it bids a deterministic price of pi = 1, the
consumers would first consume from the lower priced pro-
ducers (j 6= i) and only the leftover demand would be satis-
fied by i. Therefore, we can infer that the payment received
by i equals: pii(C) = E[min{(D −
∑
j 6=i ZjCj)
+, ZiCi}.]
Then, as per (3), we have that piN (C) =
pii(C)CNGN
CiGi
, where
Gj = E[min(Zj ,
D
Cj
)] for all j. We have that:
piN (C) = E[min{(D −
∑
j 6=i
ZjCj)
+, ZiCi}]CNGN
CiGi
< E[min{(D −
∑
j 6=N
ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}]GN
Gi
≤ E[min{(D −
∑
j 6=N
ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}]. (12)
The strict inequality comes from the fact that Ci < CN
and that Zi, ZN are identically distributed (conditional
on Z−i,N ). The final inequality comes from the fact that
GN ≤ Gi since Ci < CN . However, (12) is a lower bound
on the producer N ’s payment if it deviates to bidding a de-
terministic price of pN = 1, and so, we have a contradiction
since producers cannot strictly improve their payments by
deviating at equilibrium. In summary, we have that only
producer N can have an atom at the upper support. As we
argued before, since no other producer as an atom at the
upper support, when producer N bids pN = 1, it only gets
the leftover demand and therefore, its payment is given by
piN (C) = E[min{(D −
∑
j 6=N ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}.]
APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Suppose that at the optimum solution that minimizes Equa-
tion (5), the aggregate capacity investment by the producers
is C∗tot, and let C
∗
1 = C
∗
2 = . . . = C
∗
N =
C∗tot
N ≥ 0. Then, in
order to prove Theorem (1), it is sufficient to show that for
any capacity C1, C2, . . . , CN ≥ 0 with
∑N
i=1 Ci = C
∗
tot, the
following equation is satisfied:
E[(D −
N∑
i=1
ZiC
∗
i )
+] ≤ E[(D −
N∑
i=1
ZiCi)
+].
In fact, using the transformation that for any capac-
ity vector (C ′1, . . . , C
′
N ), E[(D −
∑N
i=1 ZiC
′
i)
+] = ED −
E[min(D,
∑N
i=1 ZiC
′
i)], the above equation can be rewritten
as:
E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
ZiC
∗
i )] ≥ E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
ZiCi)]. (13)
So, to prove Theorem 1, it is indeed sufficient to prove
Equation (13). To prove this, we introduce Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3.
Proposition 2. Let us consider the following definitions:
• X1 := Z1C1N + Z2
C2
N + . . .+ ZN
CN
N ,
• X2 := Z1C2N + Z2
C3
N + . . .+ ZN
C1
N
• . . .
• XN := Z1CNN + Z2
C1
N + . . .+ ZN
CN−1
N
That is:
Xi =
N∑
j=1
Zj
Ci+j−1
N
, (14)
where i+ j − 1 is computed modulo N .
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Then:
E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
Xi)] ≥
N∑
i=1
E[min(
D
N
,Xi)]. (15)
Proof. We prove the inequality by proving that inequality
holds for each realization of X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , XN =
xN and each realization of D = d. Denote the whole index
set by N . In each realization, there are the following four
scenarios:
• Each of xi is smaller than dN . In this case,
min(d,
∑N
i=1 xi) =
∑N
i=1 xi, and min(
d
N , xi) = xi.
So equality holds.
• Each of xi is bigger than dN . In this case,
min(d,
∑N
i=1 xi) = d, and min(
d
N , xi) =
d
N . So
equality again holds.
• xj , j ∈ J ⊆ N is bigger than dN , the rest are
smaller than dN , but
∑N
i=1 xi ≤ d. In this case,
min(d,
∑N
i=1 xi) =
∑N
i=1 xi. The RHS of (15) reduces
to dN |J | +
∑
i∈N\J xi ≤
∑N
i=1 xi. Therefore, the
inequality holds.
• xj , j ∈ J ⊆ N is smaller than dN , the rest are bigger
than dN , but
∑N
i=1 xi ≥ d. The RHS of (15) reduces to
d
N (N−|J |)+
∑
j∈J xj ≤ d. Therefore, the inequality
holds.
In all cases, we have that:
E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
Xi)] ≥
N∑
i=1
E[min(
D
N
,Xi)]. (16)
Proposition 3. With the assumptions in Proposition 2, we have:
E[min(
D
N
,Xi)] = E[min(
D
N
,X1)],∀i ∈ N . (17)
To prove Proposition 3, we introduce Fact 1. It is based
on exchangeability of independent random variables, and
that Zi’s’ are i.i.d. copies. We refer to [35] for interested users
and omit the proof here.
Fact 1. If Zi’s are i.i.d. random variables, then:
f(z1, z2, . . . , zN ) = f(zS1 , zS2 , . . . , zSN ), (18)
where S1, S2, . . . , SN is a permutation of 1, 2, . . . , SN , and f(·)
is the density function.
Now we proceed to prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using Fact 1, we show that
E[min(DN , Xi)] is the same for all i:
E[min(D/N,Xi)] = E[min(D/N,
N∑
j=1
Zj
Ci+j−1
N
)]
(a)
= E[min(D/N,
N∑
j=1
Zi+j−1
Ci+j−1
N
)]
(b)
= E[min(D/N,
N∑
k=1
Zk
Ck
N
)]
= E[min(D/N,X1)],
(19)
where (a) is based on the observation that [i, i + 1, . . . , i +
N−1], mod N, ∀i is a permutation of [1, 2, . . . , N ], and (b)
is the result of rearranging Ci+j−1.
Now, we are ready to prove (13). Let (Xi)Ni=1 be as
defined in the statement of Proposition 2. The LHS of (13)
can be written as:
E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
ZiC
∗
i )] = E[min(D,
∑
i
ZiC
∗
tot/N)]
(a)
= E[min(D,
∑
i
Zi
∑
j C
∗
j
N
)]
(b)
= E[min(D,
∑
i
ZiXi)]
(c)
≥
N∑
i=1
E[min(
D
N
,Xi)]
(d)
=
N∑
i=1
E[min(
D
N
,X1)]
= NE[min(
D
N
,X1)]
= E[min(D,
N∑
i=1
ZiCi)],
(20)
where we decompose C∗tot into individual C
∗
j ’s in (a) and
use definition of Xi in Proposition 2. Inequality (c) is again
based on Proposition 2 and (d) is based on Proposition 3.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
Suppose that there are N producers in the market, and sup-
pose that the optimal capacity from solving (5) is denoted
by C∗1 , C
∗
2 , ..., C
∗
N , we argue that C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , ..., C
∗
N is a Nash
equilibrium for the capacity game in (1).
We prove the equilibrium for player 1, and the same
argument holds for any of the rest players. To show this,
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we rewrite C∗1 as the following:
C∗1 = argmin
C1
γC1 + γ
N∑
i=2
C∗i + E{(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi − Z1C1)+}
= argmin
C1
γC1 +D − Emin{D,
N∑
i=2
ZiCi + Z1C1}
= argmin
C1
γC1 − Emin{D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi, Z1C1}
= argmin
C1
γC1 − Emin{(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi)
+, Z1C1}
−minE{(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi)
−, Z1C1}
= argmin
C1
γC1 − Emin{(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi)
+, Z1C1}
− E(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi)
−
= argmax
C1
Emin{(D −
N∑
i=2
ZiCi)
+, Z1C1} − γC1
= C1 ,
(21)
which characterizes the optimal solution to the game de-
picted in (1).
APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR THEOREM 4
Similar to the proof for Theorem 1, we need to show that
(13) is true when Zi = Z¯ + Zˆi as given in (10). The proof
boils down to show that Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are
true under such asssumption on correlation. Note that the
proof for Proposition 2 does not require that Zi’s to be i.i.d.,
therefore naturally carries over. To show Proposition 3, we
need Lemma 1. Then these two propositions validate (13),
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 1. If Zi = Z¯ + Zˆi as (10), then:
f(z1, z2, . . . , zN ) = f(zS1 , zS2 , . . . , zSN ),
where S1, S2, . . . , SN is a permutation of 1, 2, . . . , SN , and f(·)
is the density function.
Proof.
f(z1, z2, . . . , zN )
= f(z¯ + zˆ1, z¯ + zˆ2, . . . , z¯ + zˆN )
=
∫
z¯
f({z¯ + zˆ1, z¯ + zˆ2, . . . , z¯ + zˆN}|Z¯ = z¯)f(Z¯ = z¯)dz¯
(a)
=
∫
z¯
f(z¯ + zˆ1, z¯ + zˆ2, . . . , z¯ + zˆN )f(Z¯ = z¯)dz¯
(b)
=
∫
z¯
f(z¯ + zˆS1 , z¯ + zˆS2 , . . . , z¯ + zˆSN )f(Z¯ = z¯)dz¯
= f(zS1 , zS2 , . . . , zSN ),
where (a) is based on the assumption that Z¯ is independent
of Zˆi (assumption A3), and (b) is based on Fact 1.
APPENDIX E
PROOF FOR THEOREMS 3 AND THEOREM 5
E.1 Berry-Esseen Theorem
The following Lemma is useful to facilitate the proofs of
Theorem 3 and Theorem 5. It relates the behavior of the
mean of independent random variables to a standard Gaus-
sian distribution in terms of CDF.
Lemma 2 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). There exists a positive
constant α, such that if X1, X2, . . . , XN , are independent
random variables with E(Xi) = 0, E(X2i ) = σ2 > 0, and
E(|Xi|3) = ρi < ∞, and if we define SN =
∑
iXi√∑
i σ
2
i
, then FN ,
the cumulative distribution function of SN is close to Φ, the CDF
of the standard Gaussian distribution. This is mathematically
interpreted as:
|FN (x)− Φ(x)| ≤ αψ, (22)
where ψ = (
∑
i σ
2
i )
− 12 max1≤i≤N ρiσ2i .
E.2 Some useful lemmas
Before the detailed proof, let us visit some useful propo-
sitions and lemmas that assist the proofs for Theorem 3
and Theorem 5. In what follows, we assume without loss of
generality that given any solution (C1, C2, . . . , CN ), it must
be the case that C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ CN .
Proposition 4. The partial derivative of
piN (C−N , CN ) = E(min(D −
∑N−1
j=1 CiZi)
+, CN ) is:
∂piN (C−N , CN )
∂CN
= E
1{(D − N−1∑
j=1
CjZj)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN},
(23)
and for all i 6= N .
∂piN (C−N , CN )
∂Ci
= E
1{0 ≤ (D − N−1∑
j=1
CjZj) ≤ CNZN}(−Zi)
 .
(24)
Based on Proposition 4, we have the following lemma
on the optimality of the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Lemma 3. If the invested capacity at Nash equilibrium is sym-
metric, i.e., C1 = C2 = · · · = CN = C , then:
• γ = E
[
1
{
(D − C∑Nj 6=i Zj)+ ≥ CZi}Zi], where
1{·} is the indicator function and takes value 1 if the
argument is true, otherwise takes value 0.
• NC ≤ ED/γ.
Proof. We begin by proving the first part. Suppose that
capacities are the same, i.e., C1 = C2 = · · · = CN = C ,
the profit for each producer in the capacity game is:
E
min
(D − C N∑
j 6=i
Zj)
+, CZi
− γC. (25)
The optimality of a player i in the game is captured as
the following:
∂
∂Ci
E
min
(D − C N∑
j 6=i
Zj)
+, CiZi
− γ = 0. (26)
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Differentiating in the expectation with respect to each indi-
vidual Ci and based on Proposition 4, we have:
γ = E
1
(D − C
N∑
j 6=i
Zj)
+ ≥ CZi
Zi
 , (27)
where 1{·} is the indicator function and takes value 1 if the
argument is true, otherwise takes value 0.
Then we proceed to prove the second part, i.e., NC ≤
ED/γ.
When there is a social planner making centralized deci-
sion as described in (5), the total payment from the electric-
ity consumers in the system is
min
Ci,∀i=1,2,...,N
E
[
(D −
N∑
i=1
CiZi)
+
]
+ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci, (28)
where each site should have the same optimal invested
capacity C1 = C2 = · · · = CN = C as discussed in Section
4. This also coincides with the symmetric Nash equilibrium
in the capacity game.
To show that NC is a bounded by a constant, assuming
differentiability and based on (28), we know
γN = E
[
1(D ≥ C
N∑
i=1
Zi)
N∑
i=1
Zi
]
(29)
= E
[
1(
N∑
i=1
Zi ≤ D/C)
N∑
i=1
Zi
]
(30)
≤ E
[
1(
N∑
i=1
Zi ≤ D/C)D/C
]
(31)
≤ ED/C, (32)
rearranging, we get NC ≤ ED/γ.
Based on Lemma 3, we now present two lemmas on
arbitrary Nash equilibria of the game in Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5.
Lemma 4. Given any equilibrium solution of the two-level game
(C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ), it must be the case that C

1 ≤ EDγN and CN ≤
ED
γ .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the first part of the
above statement is not true and there exists an equilibrium
solution (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) such that
ED
γN < C

1 ≤ . . . ≤ CN .
Recall the formula for the payment received by producer N ,
i.e.,
piN (C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) = E[(D −
∑
i 6=N C

i Zi)
+, CNZN )].
Since this is an equilibrium solution, the derivative of this
payment must equal the investment cost γ. More specif-
ically, using the expression for the derivative that was
previously derived in Equation (27), we have that
(
d
dC
piN (C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C)
)
C=CN
= γ
=⇒ E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN
 = γ.
Now, since the symmetric equilibrium solution
(C∗, . . . , C∗) also satisfies this condition, we have that:
E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
C∗Zi)+ ≥ C∗ZN
ZN
 = γ.
Further, recall that in the symmetric equilibrium C∗ ≤
ED
γN as derived in Equation (32). Since C

1 >
ED
γN , this implies
that C1 > C
∗. Finally, let E denote the set of events3
1
{
(D −∑i6=N Ci Zi)+ ≥ CNZN} and let E∗ denote the
events satisfying
1
{
(D −∑i6=N C∗Zi)+ ≥ C∗ZN}. Since C∗ < C1 ≤ C2 ≤
. . . ≤ CN , it is not hard to deduce that E ⊂ E∗. In-
deed for any (non-zero) instantiation (Z1, . . . , ZN ) when
(D−∑i 6=N C∗Zi)+ > 0, we have that (D−∑i 6=N Ci Zi)+ <
(D−∑i6=N C∗Zi)+ and CNZN > C∗ZN . Therefore, we get
that:
E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN
 <
E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
C∗Zi)+ ≥ C∗ZN
ZN
 = γ,
which is a contradiction.
Next, we prove that at equilibrium CN ≤ EDγ . The
proof is somewhat similar and once again, proceeds by
contradiction. Suppose that CN >
ED
γ . Now, we have:
γ = E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN

≤ E [1 {D ≥ CNZN}ZN ]
< E
[
1
{
D ≥ ED
γ
ZN
}
ZN
]
= E
[
1
{
γ ≥ ED
D
ZN
}
ZN
]
≤ E
[
1
{
γ ≥ ED
D
ZN
}
D
ED
γ
]
=
1
ED
γE{1
{
γ ≥ ED
D
ZN
}
D}
≤ γ,
which is an obvious contradiction.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Ci ≤ Cj ≤ EDk for some k ≤ 1. Then,
we have that:
E[min(Zj ,
D
Cj
)] ≤ E[min(Zi, D
Ci
)].
E[min(Zj ,
D
Cj
)] ≥ qkE[Zi].
Proof. The first part is easy to see. For any instantiation of Zj
andD, we have that min(Zj , D/Cj) ≤ min(Zj , D/Ci) since
Ci ≤ Cj . Taking the expectation, and changing the variable
3. For our purposes, an event is a tuple of instantiations of the
i.i.d random variables (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN ) and D satisfying the required
condition
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from Zj to Zi (these variables have the same marginal
distribution due to either i.i.d assumption, or follows (10)),
we get that:
E[min(Zj ,
D
Cj
)] ≤ E[min(Zj , D
Ci
)] = E[min(Zi,
D
Ci
)].
The second part of the lemma can be proved as follows: once
again fix any instantiation of Zj , we have that:
ED|Zj min(Zj ,
D
Cj
) ≥ EDD|Zj1{D ≥ ED}min(Zj ,
D
Cj
)
≥ qmin(Zj , k)
≥ qkmin(Zj , 1)
= qkZj
(33)
Taking the expectation, we get the required result.
Last, we present a lemma on the bound for integrating
on a standard Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 6. Let Φ(·) denote the CDF for standard Gaussian
distribution, i.e., zero mean and unit variance. Then:
Φ(x)− Φ(y) ≤ 1√
2pi
(x− y), x > y. (34)
Lemma 6 is a direct observation based on the density
function f(x) of standard Gaussian random variable, i.e.,
f(x) = 1√
2pi
e−x
2
which has a maximum value of 1√
2pi
.
E.3 Proof for Theorem 5 and Theorem 3
Now we proceed to prove Theorem 5 and Theorem 3. Note
that Theorem 3 is a special case of 5 when Z¯ = 0, in the
following proof, we assume that Zi = Z¯ + Zˆi as in (10).
To avoid lengthy notation, let us define Gi =
E[min(Zi, D/Ci )] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Consider the payment
received by the producer with the smallest investment,
which happens to be C1 . As per Equation (3), this equals:
pi1(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) = piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
C1G1
CNGN
= piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
C1E[Z1]
CNGN
.
(35)
The second equation comes from our assumption that
N > 1Dmin
Dmax
γ
. Therefore by Lemma 4, we have that C1 ≤ D
and G1 = E[min(Z1, 1)] = E[Z1]. In what follows, we
will continue to use G1 = E[Z1] for consistency but re-
mark that G1 is a constant that is independent of C1 . The
total profit made by this producer is pi1(C1 , . . . , C

N ) −
γC1 . Since this is an equilibrium solution, we have that(
d
dCpi1(C,C

2 , . . . , C

N )
)
C=C1
= γ. Expanding the differen-
tiation term, we get that:
G1
CNGN
(
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
− C1E[1
0 ≤ D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN
Z1
)
= γ.
(36)
In the above equation, we used
the fact that: ddCpiN (C, . . . , C

N ) =
E[1
{
0 ≤ D − CZ1 +
∑N−1
i=2 C

i Zi ≤ CNZN
}
− Z1].
Rearranging Equation (36), we get an upper bound for the
payment made to producer N , namely
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) = γ
CNGN
G1
+ C1E[1{0 ≤ D −
∑
i6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN}Z1].
(37)
Fix some constant κ. The rest of the proof proceeds in
two cases:
(Case I:
∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 )
Intuitively, this refers to the case where the investments
are rather asymmetric—i.e., the investment by the ‘larger
producers’ is significantly bigger than that by the ‘smaller
producers’. Note that in Equation (37), Z1 ≤ 1. Therefore,
we get:
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
CNGN
G1
+ C1E[1{0 ≤ D −
∑
i6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN}]
= γ
CNGN
G1
+ C1Pr
0 ≤ D −∑
i6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN

≤ γC

NGN
G1
+ C1 .
Recall from Lemma 4 that in any equilibrium solution,
we must have that C1 ≤ EDγN . Substituting this above, we
get that
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
CNGN
G1
+
ED
γN
.
Next, observe that for any i 6= N , we can apply Proposi-
tion 1 to obtain an upper bound on its profit, namely that:
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ piN (C1 , . . . , CN )
Ci Gi
CNGN
≤
(
γ
CNGN
G1
+
ED
γN
)
Ci Gi
CNGN
= γ
Ci Gi
G1
+
EDCi Gi
γNCNGN
≤ γCi +
EDCi E[Zi]
qγNCNγE[ZN ]
(38)
= γCi +
EDCi
qγ2NCN
. (39)
Equations (38) and (39) were derived using Lemma 5,
namely we used the simple properties that (i) Gi ≤ G1, (ii)
Gi ≤ E[Zi], and (iii) GN ≥ qγE[ZN ], and finally the fact
that E[Zi] = E[ZN ].
Summing up (39) over all i including i = N , we get that
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
Nqγ2
(
N∑
i=1
Ci
CN
)
.
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Of course, as per our assumption, we have that∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 . Substituting this above, we get that
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
Nqγ2
(
κN
3
4 + 1)
)
.
≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
qγ2
(
κN−
1
4 +
1
N
)
.
This proves the theorem statement for the case where∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 . Note that the 1N term can be incor-
porated into the constant α, without affecting any of the
asymptotic bounds.
(Case II:
∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
> κN
3
4 )
Let us go back to Equation (36) and consider the term
B = E[1
{
0 ≤ D −∑i 6=N Ci Zi ≤ CNZN}Z1]. We will
now obtain a tighter upper bound on this quantity condi-
tional upon
∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
> κN
3
4 . First note that applying the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can get a lower bound on
the sum-of-squares, i.e.,
N−1∑
i=1
(
Ci
CN
)2 ≥ 1
N − 1(
N−1∑
i=1
Ci /C

N )
2 ≥ κ
2N3/2
N − 1 ≥ 2κ
2N
1
2 .
(40)
The final simplification comes from the fact that N ≥ 2
(since we assumed N > 1γ ≥ 1). Next, we have that:
B ≤ E[1
0 ≤ D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN
]
= Pr·|D
D − CNZN ≤∑
i6=N
Ci Zi ≤ D

= ED Pr·|D
 D
CN
− ZN ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN

≤ ED Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN
 .
Using the fact that Zi = Zˆi + Z¯ , we can write out the
probability more explicitly:
ED Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN

= ED Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
(Zˆi + Z¯) ≤ D
CN
 .
(41)
Let us denote Z0 =
∑
i6=N
Ci
CN
Z¯ and Z ′ =
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zˆi.
From the assumption A3 along with (10) we know that Z¯
is independent of Zˆi, therefore Z0 is independent of Z ′.
The probability in (41) can be written as an integral over
the possible values for Z0 with fZ0(·) being the probability
density function for the random variable Z0. So, we have:
ED Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN

= ED Pr·|D
(
D
CN
− 1 ≤ Z0 + Z ′ ≤ D
CN
)
(a)
= ED
∫ D
C
N
0
fZ0(z)Pr
(
D
CN
− 1 ≤ Z0 + Z ′ ≤ D
CN
|Z0 = z
)
dz
(b)
= ED
∫ D
C
N
0
fZ0(z)Pr{
D
CN
− 1− z ≤ Z ′ ≤ D
CN
− z}dz,
(42)
where (a) uses the property of conditional probability, and
(b) is based on the fact that Z0 and Z ′ are independent.
Since Z ′ =
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zˆi, where Zˆi’s are i.i.d. ran-
dom variables and EZˆi = µˆ, E(Zˆi − EZˆi)2 = σˆ2 > 0,
E|Zˆi − EZˆi|3 = ρˆ < ∞, this variable has a mean µ′ =
µˆ
∑N−1
i=1 C

i /C

N ≥ µˆκN
3
4 . Similarly, the variance of Z ′ can
be written as (σ′)2 = σˆ2
∑N−1
i=1 (
Ci
CN
)2. Now, applying Equa-
tion (40), we get the following lower bound for variance:
(σ′)2 ≥ 2σˆ2κ2N 12 . (43)
Note that C

i
CN
Zˆi are independent random variables be-
cause Zˆi’s are i.i.d.. What is more, we know that
Ci
CN
Zˆi has
mean µ¯i =
Ci
CN
µˆ, non negative variance σ¯2i = (
Ci
CN
)2σˆ2
and finite centered third moment ρ¯i = (
Ci
CN
)3ρˆ. Denote
SN =
Z′−∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
and let FN denote the CDF of SN . We
rewrite the probability of interest as the following:
Pr
·|D
 D
CN
− 1− z ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zˆi ≤ D
CN
− z

= Pr
·|D
(
D
CN
− 1− z ≤ Z ′ ≤ D
CN
− z
)
= Pr
·|D
 DCN − 1− z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
≤ Z
′ −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
≤
D
CN
− z∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i

=
FN
 DCN − z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
− FN
 DCN − 1− z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
 .
(44)
We can now apply the Berry-Esseen Theorem from
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Lemma 2 to get an upper bound:
Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1− z ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zˆi ≤ D
CN
− z

=FN
 DCN − z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
− FN
 DCN − 1− z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i

(a)
≤Φ
 DCN − z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
− Φ
 DCN − 1− z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i

+2α(
∑
i
σ¯2i )
− 12 max
i
ρ¯i
σ¯2i
(b)
≤Φ
 DCN − z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
− Φ
 DCN − 1− z −∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i

+2α(2σ¯2κ2N−
1
4 ) max
i
(
Ci
CN
ρ¯
σ¯2
)
(c)
≤ 1√
2pi
1√∑
i σ¯
2
i
+ 2α(2σ¯2κ2N−
1
4 )(
ρ¯
σ¯2
)
(d)
≤κ′N− 14 ,
(45)
where Φ(·) is the CDF for standard Gaussian distribution.
Inequality (a) applies Berry Esseen Theorem to FN (x) at
x =
D
C
N
−z−∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
and x =
D
C
N
−1−z−∑i µ¯i√∑
i σ¯
2
i
. Inequality (b)
is based on (43). Inequality (c) is based on Lemma 6.
Inequality (c) also depends on the fact that C

i
CN
< 1,∀i.
Lastly, (d) uses the fact that 1∑
i σ¯
2
i
≤ 1√
2σ2κ2N
1
2
from (43),
and rewrites the constants into κ′ for brevity.
Plugging the above upper bound back to (42), we get
that:
Pr
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN

≤κ′N− 14
∫ D/CN
0
fZ0(z)dz
≤κ′N− 14 .
(46)
If Z¯ = 0, then Zi’s are i.i.d. random variables, then
Z0 = 0 and the bound naturally carries over, as stated in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If Zi’s are i.i.d. random variables, then it is a special
case of correlated Zi’s in Assumption A3 when Z¯ , and the upper
bound in (45) is valid for i.i.d. Zi’s, i.e.:
Pr·|D
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN
 ≤ κ′N− 14 . (47)
Now we can complete the proof. Going back to (37), and
substituting the above upper bound to get that:
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ
CNGN
G1
+ C1κ
′N−
1
4
≤ γC

NGN
G1
+
ED
γN
κ′N−
1
4 . (48)
Next, we upper bound the aggregate payment made to
the producers using Proposition 1. Recall that Gi ≤ G1 for
all i and that GN ≥ γE[ZN ] as per Lemma 5. We now get
that:
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N )
≤
N∑
i=1
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
C¯iGi
CNGN
≤
N∑
i=1
(
γ
CNGN
G1
+
DGi
γNGN
κ′N−
1
4
)
C¯iGi
CNGN
≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci
Gi
G1
+
ED
qγ2N
κ′N−
1
4
N∑
i=1
C¯i
CN
≤ γ
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
qγ2N
κ′N−
1
4 ×N
= γ
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
qγ2
κ′N−
1
4 .
In the penultimate equation, we used the fact that
Ci ≤ CN and so, trivially,
∑N
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ N . This completes
the proof of the second case, and hence, the theorem.
APPENDIX F
PROOF FOR ASYMMETRIC GAMMA
Before stating the main result in this section, we extend
Lemma 4 to arbitrary investment costs to obtain an upper
bound on C1 .
Lemma 7. Given any equilibrium solution (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N )
of the two-level game with asymmetric costs (γ1, γ2 . . . , γN ), it
must be the case that C1 ≤ EDγminN .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the above statement
is not true and there exists an equilibrium solution
(C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) such that
ED
γminN
< C1 ≤ . . . ≤ CN .
Proceeding similarly to the proof of Lemma 4, we can dif-
ferentiate the profit made by the producer with the highest
capacity (CN ) to get the following:(
d
dC
piN (C

1 , C

2 , . . . , C)
)
C=CN
= γN ≥ γmin
=⇒ E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN
 ≥ γmin.
(49)
Next, consider a ‘new instance’ of the capacity-price
game with N providers, all of whom have a symmetric
investment cost equal to γmin. From Theorem 2, we know
that instances with symmetric investment costs admit sym-
metric equilibrium solutions. Let (C ′, . . . , C ′) denote the
socially optimal investment strategy for this new instance
with symmetric investment cost γmin, which is also an equi-
librium solution. Clearly, for this symmetric equilibrium,
the derivative of profit must also equal the investment cost.
Therefore:
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(
d
dC
piN (C
′, C ′, . . . , C)
)
C=C′
= γmin
=⇒ E
1
(D −∑
i 6=N
C ′Zi)+ ≥ C ′ZN
ZN
 = γmin
(50)
Further, recall that in the symmetric equilibrium for
the instance where all investment costs are γmin, it must
be that C ′ ≤ EDγminN as derived in Equation (32). Since
C1 >
ED
γminN
in our original instance, this implies that
C1 > C
′. Finally, let E denote the set of events4
1
{
(D −∑i6=N Ci Zi)+ ≥ CNZN} and let E ′ denote the
events satisfying 1
{
(D −∑i6=N C ′Zi)+ ≥ C ′ZN}. Since
C ′ < C1 ≤ C2 ≤ . . . ≤ CN , it is not hard to deduce that E ⊂
E ′. Indeed for any (non-zero) instantiation (Z1, . . . , ZN ),
we have that (D − ∑i 6=N Ci Zi)+ < (D − ∑i 6=N C ′Zi)+
and CNZN > C
′ZN . Combining (49) and (50) along
with the fact that 1
{
(D −∑i 6=N Ci Zi)+ ≥ CNZN} <
1
{
(D −∑i6=N C ′Zi)+ ≥ C ′ZN}, we get that:
γmin ≤ E
1
(D −∑
i6=N
Ci Zi)
+ ≥ CNZN
ZN
 <
E
1
(D −∑
i6=N
C ′Zi)+ ≥ C ′ZN
ZN
 = γmin,
which is a contradiction.
Now we can proceed to the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5, so we
only sketch the new arguments. As with the previous proof,
suppose that Gi = E[min(Zi, D/Ci )] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Since N > 1Dmin
Dmax
γmin
, we can invoke Lemma 7 to get that
C1 ≤ ED.
Consider the payment received by producer 1 whose
capacity happens to be C1 . As per Equation (3), this equals:
pi1(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) = piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
C1G1
CNGN
The total profit made by this producer is pi1(C1 , . . . , C

N )−
γ1C

1 . Since this is an equilibrium solution, we have that(
d
dCpii(C, . . . , C

N )
)
C=C1
= γ1. Proceeding similarly to the
proof of Theorem 4 bearing in mind that G1 is independent
of C , we get that:
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
= γ1
CNGN
G1
+ C1E[1{0 ≤ D −
∑
i 6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN}Z1].
(51)
Fix some constant κ. The rest of the proof proceeds in
two cases:
4. For our purposes, an event is a tuple of instantiations of the
i.i.d random variables (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN ) and D satisfying the required
condition.
(Case I:
∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 )
Since, Z1 ≤ 1, we can manipulate (51) to get:
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ1
CNGN
G1
+ C1Pr
0 ≤ D −∑
i6=N
Ci Zi ≤ CNZN

≤ γ1C

NGN
G1
+ C1 .
Recall from Lemma 7 that in any equilibrium solution, we
must have that C1 ≤ DγminN . Substituting this above, we get
that
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ1
CNGN
G1
+
ED
γminN
.
Next, observe that for any i 6= N , we can apply Proposi-
tion 1 to obtain an upper bound on its profit, namely that:
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ piN (C1 , . . . , CN )
Ci Gi
CNGN
≤
(
γ1
CNGN
G1
+
ED
γminN
)
Ci Gi
CNGN
≤ γ1Ci +
EDCi E[Zi]
γminNCNγNE[ZN ]
≤ γ1Ci +
EDCi
γ2minNC

N
. (52)
Recall that γN ≥ γmin.
Summing up Equation 52 over all i including i = N , we
get that
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ1
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
Nγ2min
(
N∑
i=1
Ci
CN
)
.
Of course, as per our assumption, we have that∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 . Substituting this above, we get that
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ1
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
γ2min
(
κN−
1
4 +
1
N
)
≤ γmax
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
γ2min
(
κN−
1
4 +
1
N
)
.
This proves the theorem statement for the case where∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ κN 34 .
(Case II:
∑N−1
i=1
Ci
CN
> κN
3
4 )
Let us go back to Equation (51) and consider the term
B = E[1
{
0 ≤ D −∑i6=N Ci Zi ≤ CNZN}Z1]. By pro-
ceeding identically as we did in the proof of Theorem 5
and applying the Cauchy-Scwarz inequality, we obtain the
following bound:
B ≤ Pr
 D
CN
− 1 ≤
∑
i 6=N
Ci
CN
Zi ≤ D
CN
 ≤ κ′N− 14 , . (53)
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where κ′ is some constant. Now we can complete the
proof. Going back to (51), and substituting the above upper
bound to get that:
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N ) ≤ γ1
CNGN
G1
+ C1κ
′N−
1
4
≤ γ1C

NGN
G1
+
ED
γN
κ′N−
1
4 . (54)
Next, we upper bound the aggregate payment made to
the producers using Proposition 1. Recall that Gi ≤ G1 for
all i and that GN ≥ γminE[ZN ] as per Lemma 5. We now
get that:
N∑
i=1
pii(C

1 , . . . , C

N )
≤
N∑
i=1
piN (C

1 , . . . , C

N )
C¯iGi
CNGN
≤
N∑
i=1
(
γ1
CNGN
G1
+
EDGi
γminNGN
κ′N−
1
4
)
C¯iGi
CNGN
≤ γ1
N∑
i=1
Ci
Gi
G1
+
ED
qγ2minN
κ′N−
1
4
N∑
i=1
C¯i
CN
≤ γ1
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
γ2min
κ′N−
1
4 .
≤ γmax
N∑
i=1
Ci +
ED
qγ2min
κ′N−
1
4 .
In the penultimate equation, we used the fact that
Ci ≤ CN and so, trivially,
∑N
i=1
Ci
CN
≤ N . This completes
the proof of the second case, and hence, the theorem.
APPENDIX G
PROOF FOR THEOREM 6
To prove that there is only one symmetric Nash equilibrium,
we need to show that there is a unique C such that C1 =
C2 = · · · = CN = C which minimizes the total profit in the
game:
NE
min
(D − C N∑
j 6=i
Zj)
+, CZj
− γCN. (55)
The optimality condition on C to minimize this payment
is shown in (27).
Showing a unique C maximizes (55) is equiva-
lent to showing that the right hand side that in-
volves C in (27) has only one intersection with γ, i.e.,
E
[
1
{
(D − C∑Nj 6=i Zj)+ ≥ CZi}Zi] is monotonic with re-
spect to C . This can be seen from the fact that as C increases,
(D − C∑Nj 6=i Zj)+ decreases for each realization of Zj and
CZi increases by each realization of Zi. Therefore the term
inside the expectation is monotonically decreasing as C
increases.
APPENDIX H
PROOF FOR THEOREM 7
Proof. We use a standard equilibrium existence result for
games with continuous strategy spaces originally proposed
by Debreu [36]. We refer the reader to [37] for a more
accessible restatement of the previous result which we will
utilize in this proof. In particular, we will prove a slightly
stronger claim than the theorem statement, namely that
there always exists an equilibrium (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) such
that CN = max{C1 , C2 , . . . , CN}—i.e., the maximum ca-
pacity investment at equilibrium is by the player with the
smallest investment cost γN .
Let us begin by considering a slightly restricted ver-
sion of our original PV game, where we only allow for
investment strategies C = (C1, C2, . . . , CN ) such that
CN ≥ C1, . . . , CN−1—i.e., the feasible strategies of this
game only include those where PVs {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} invest
capacities smaller than or equal to those by PV N . Recall
that for all i ≤ N , PV i’s profit is given by: pii(C) − γiCi,
where:
pii(C) = E
[
min{(D−
∑
j 6=i
ZjCj)
+, ZNCN}
] E[min(CiZi, D)]
E[min(CNZN , D)]
.
(56)
Note that the expectations are over the randomness in
both the demand D and the production (Zi)Ni=1. As per the
statement in [37], this restricted version of our game admits
a Nash equilibrium as long as the following conditions
are met:(i) The strategy space available to each player is
a compact and convex subset of the Euclidean space and
is also upper and lower hemicontinuous and non-empty
valued; (ii) pii(C) − γiCi is continuous in C and quasi-
concave in Ci for all i. It is important to note that the result
by [37] allows for the strategy of PV i to be a function of
C−i as is the case in our restricted game.
For each player i < N , the strategy space available to
this player i is C ∈ [0, CN ]. For player N its strategy space
is [maxN−1i=1 Ci, C
max], where Cmax is some finite upper
bound on the maximum possible investment by a player.
Clearly, each player’s strategy space is convex, compact,
continuous, and non-empty valued. It only remains for us
to prove that the profit function is continuous and quasi-
concave. From (56), it is not hard to observe that all the
three components that make up pii(C) are continuous in all
its inputs, i.e.,
1) E
[
min{(D −∑j 6=i ZjCj)+, ZNCN}]
2) E[min(CiZi, D)]
3) E[min(CNZN , D)]
are all continuous in the vector of capacities C. Therefore, it
follows that pii(C)− γiCi is continuous in C for all i.
To prove quasi-concavity, we need to show that
pii(λC
(1)
i + (1− λ)C(2)i ,C−i)− γi(λC(1)i + (1− λ)C(2)i )
≥ min{pii(C(1)i ,C−i)− γiC(1)i , pii(C(2)i ,C−i)− γiC(2)i },
for arbitrary C(1)i , C
(2)
i ≤ CN and all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Without
loss of generality, fix some C(1)i ≤ C(2)i ≤ CN and λ ∈ [0, 1].
In order to prove quasi-concavity via the above inequality,
it is sufficient to prove that the derivative of the PV profit,
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i.e., ddCi (pii(Ci,C−i)− γiCi) is monotonically decreasing in
Ci. Indeed, suppose that C˜i denotes the point where
d
dCi
(pii(Ci,C−i)− γiCi)Ci=C˜i = 0.
Then, the derivative being monotonically non-increasing
implies that the function pii(Ci,C−i) − γiCi is increasing
from Ci = 0 to Ci = C˜i and decreasing from Ci = C˜i to
Ci = CN . This naturally implies quasi-concavity. In order
to prove the required condition on the derivative, consider
differentiating pii(C) with respect to Ci. This gives us:
d
dCi
pii(Ci,C−i) =
1
CNGN
(
piN (C)
d
dCi
E[min(CiZi, D)]
−E[min(CiZi, D)])E[1{0 ≤ D −
∑
i 6=N
CiZi ≤ CNZN}Zi]
)
,
where GN = E[min{ZN , DCN }]. In the above differentia-
tion, we used (56) to obtain the expression for pii(C) and
Proposition 4 for the expression ddCipiN (C). The fact that
d
dCi
(pii(Ci,C−i)− γiCi) is non-increasing in Ci comes from
the observations below:
1) piN (C) = E[min((D −
∑
j 6=N CiZi)
+, CNZN )] is
non-increasing in Ci.
2) ddCiE[min(CiZi, D)] = E[1 {D ≥ CiZi}Zi] is non-
increasing in Ci.
3) E[min(CiZi, D)]) is non-decreasing in Ci and there-
fore, −E[min(CiZi, D)]) is non-increasing in the
same argument.
4) E[1
{
0 ≤ D −∑i 6=N CiZi ≤ CNZN}Zi is non-
decreasing in Ci and thus, its negative is non-
increasing in the same argument.
To sum up, we have shown that ddCipii(C) and therefore,
d
dCi
(pii(C) − γiCi) is non-increasing in Ci, which in turn
implies quasi-concavity. We can then apply the equilibrium
existence result from [36], [37] to show that the restricted
version of our original PV game where player N has the
highest capacity investment always admits a Nash equilib-
rium. To complete the proof, we need to show that the Nash
equilibrium for this restricted game is also an equilibrium
for our original PV game with no restrictions on the player
strategies. Suppose that C = (C1 , C

2 , . . . , C

N ) denotes an
equilibrium for the restricted game and assume by contra-
diction that this is not an equilibrium for the original game.
Then, only one of two possibilities can occur: (i) either there
exists player i < N , who can strictly improve its profit by
increasing its capacity investment to C ′i > C

N or (ii) player
N can strictly increase its profit by lowering its capacity
investment to C ′N < maxi 6=N C

i .
Consider the first case. We will prove that if there exists
such a player i, then it must also be true that player N
can increase its capacity investment and consequentially, its
profit which contradicts the fact that C is an equilibrium
for the restricted game. If such an improving strategy exists
for player i, it must definitely be the case that the right
hand derivative of its profit at Ci = CN must be strictly
positive—this is because the derivative of player i’s profit is
monotonically non-increasing in Ci when Ci ≥ CN . That is,
we have that:
d
dCi
(pii(Ci,C

−i))Ci=(CN )+ =
d
dCi
(E[min((D −
∑
j 6=i
CjZj)
+, CiZi)])Ci=CN > γi.
Note that the derivative in the right hand side above
equals
−E
1{0 ≤ (D −∑
j 6=i
CjZj) ≤ CNZi}Zi

by Proposition 4. However, since γi ≥ γN , this in turn
implies that
d
dCN
(piN (CN ,C

−N ))CN=(CN ) =
−E
1{0 ≤ (D −∑
j 6=N
CjZj) ≤ CNZN}ZN
 > γN .
Recall by our assumption that ZN and Zi are identically
distributed conditional on (Zj)j 6=i,N . In words, this means
that player N can also increase its capacity and its profit.
This is of course a contradiction of the fact that C is an
equilibrium for the restricted game.
In the second case, suppose that player N can lower
its capacity and improve profits. The proof in this case is
quite analogous to the previous case. Indeed, if playerN can
lower its capacity to C ′N < maxj 6=N C

j and increase profits,
then one can use monotonicity arguments similar to before
to show that the player i = arg maxj 6=N Cj can also lower
its capacity investment and improve profits. Once again, a
contradiction of the fact that C is an equilibrium for the
restricted game. This completes our proof that there exists
a Nash equilibrium C for the PV game with asymmetric
investment costs.
